that is, which decisionmaker more accurately assigns liability and awards damages given the facts of a case and the governing legal standards. This issue is necessarily a comparative one, as no legal decisionmaker is infallible. 4 A full comparison of jury and arbitral decisionmaking is well beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article focuses on an aspect of arbitral decisionmaking that has been largely unexamined: the extent to which decisionmaking by arbitrators is affected by heuristics ("rules of thumb") and cognitive biases. 5 Much attention has been given to how such "cognitive illusions" affect decisionmaking by juries. The experimental results have been summarized as follows:
Decades of research on juries indicates that cognitive illusions adversely affect the quality of adjudication. Researchers have found, for example, that juries believe that litigants should have predicted events that no one could have predicted, allow irrelevant or inadmissible information to influence liability determinations, defer to arbitrary numerical estimates, and rely on incoherent methods to calculate damages. 6 Less, albeit increasing, attention has been given to how cognitive illusions affect decisionmaking by judges. The experimental studies to date, while mixed, have found that judges are less affected by some cognitive illusions, but similarly affected by others. 7 Almost no attention, however, has been given to how cognitive illusions might affect arbitral decisionmaking. ("Several legal scholars have pointed out that the appropriate standard by which to evaluate the quality of jury performance is not some absolute benchmark of perfection, but rather the performance of the most likely alternative factfinder, the trial judge. Or, to extend the argument, the arbitrator, or the expert tribunal."). 449, 482 (1996) ; Sternlight, supra note 1, at 692-93. A central question is the extent to which market forces may protect consumers who, for whatever reason-cognitive illusions, high information costs, and so forth-do not protect themselves. Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 765-66. The mere presence of an arbitration clause in a consumer contract does not necessarily mean that the business drafting the contract analysis of the legal system 9 to private judging, and considers the implications of that analysis for the debate on predispute consumer arbitration clauses. Empirical evidence on the effect of cognitive illusions in arbitral decisionmaking is extremely limited. Further complicating the analysis of private judging are structural differences between arbitration hearings and jury trials that may heighten or dampen the effect of cognitive illusions on decisionmaking in the real world. Nevertheless, assuming arbitrators are more like judges than jurors in their decisionmaking-a seemingly reasonable assumption-studies comparing the effect of cognitive illusions on judges and jurors provide at least a starting point for making predictions about arbitral decisionmaking. On this view, this Article tentatively concludes that, like judges, arbitrators may be less susceptible to at least some cognitive illusions than are jurors.
See generally HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGEMENT (Thomas
If subsequent research bears out this tentative conclusion, it would have important implications for the ongoing debate over consumer arbitration. If arbitral decisionmaking is less subject to the effects of cognitive illusions than jury decisionmaking, then the use of arbitration may improve the accuracy of dispute resolution, reducing the risk of overcompensation rather than resulting in undercompensation. 10 This is not to suggest that utilitarian arguments about the nature of legal decisionmaking should be used to override constitutional protections, 11 or that juries might not serve other functions beyond dispute resolution. 12 Instead, the point is simply that when Congress and other policymakers consider whether to restrict the enforceability of consumer arbitration agreements, they should not assume that juries necessarily make "better" decisions than arbitrators.
is taking advantage of the consumer. Limitations on consumer decisionmaking, such as cognitive biases and the use of heuristics, while certainly one consideration in evaluating whether the use of arbitration benefits or harms consumers, are by no means the only one. One often overlooked consideration is the extent to which business reputation and similar market sanctions may counteract the take-it-or-leave-it nature of many consumer form contracts. Id. at 767-69; see RICHARD CRASWELL & ALAN SCHWARTZ, FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 322-23 (1994) ("Sellers who use unreasonable terms get a reputation for having undesirable contracts.").
9. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 739 (2000) (noting that the field is variously referred to as "the psychology of judgment and decision-making," "behavioral economics," and "behavioral decision theory").
10. Even if arbitral decisionmaking is comparable only to jury decisionmaking, this would indicate that some criticisms of consumer arbitration are overstated.
11. See Sternlight, supra note 1, at 733 ("Whatever the arguable benefits of binding arbitration over litigation, our Constitution states that jury trials are to be preferred over arbitration."). Part II provides an overview of cognitive illusions relevant to decisionmaking by judges, jurors, and arbitrators. Part III summarizes empirical studies that shed light on the effect of cognitive illusions on arbitral decisionmaking. Part IV examines structural differences between jury decisionmaking and arbitral decisionmaking that may increase or decrease the effect of cognitive illusions. Part V concludes with a call for more research.
II HEURISTICS AND COGNITIVE BIASES: AN OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO JURORS
Experimental studies suggest a number of ways in which human behavior systematically departs from a rational-actor model. This Part describes several such "cognitive illusions"-hindsight bias, anchoring, the representativeness heuristic, and extremeness aversion-and examines their application to legal decisionmaking, particularly by jurors. 13 Certainly there is reason to be cautious about applying laboratory results to real-world settings. But given how juries are selected and jurors' freedom from market incentives, if any legal decisionmaker is susceptible to cognitive illusions, the jury seems the most likely, even taking into account institutional devices for lessening their influence.
A. An Overview of Heuristics and Cognitive Biases 1. Hindsight Bias "Hindsight is 20/20," the saying goes. Once people know that an event has occurred, it is extremely difficult for them to ignore that occurrence when evaluating the probability that the event would occur in the first place.
14 As Baruch Fischhoff explains:
In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in foresight. They not only tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable but also to view it as having appeared "relatively inevitable" before it happened. People believe that others should have been able to anticipate events much better than was actually the case. They even misremember their own predictions so as to exaggerate in hindsight what they knew in foresight . . . . ; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 139 ("Heuristics are not biases, and often they are good, because they economize on decision costs; but they can lead to several mistakes."). I use the phrase "cognitive illusions" to refer collectively to cognitive biases and heuristics.
14. Of course, not all uses of hindsight in decisionmaking are inappropriate. 16 If people learn by experience, one would expect them to increase their estimates of the probability of future events based on past events. Moreover, "the fact that something happened provides some information about the risky behavior." 17 "Hindsight bias" occurs when the influence of hindsight on judgment exceeds that which is justifiable.
Experimental studies have found hindsight bias in a variety of decisionmaking settings.
18
For example, Kim A. Kamin and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski administered a problem based on the well-known tort case of In Re Kinsman Transit Co.
19 to a group of experimental subjects. 20 In Kamin and Rachlinski's study, subjects in the "foresight condition" were asked to determine whether the risk of a flood was such that the city should hire a bridge operator during winter months when the drawbridge was not used. Subjects in the "hindsight" condition were told that hiring a bridge operator could have prevented debris from becoming lodged under the bridge and causing a flood. Both were asked to decide whether the city should have hired a bridge operator. 21 Only 24% of the subjects in the foresight condition required the city to hire a bridge operator, while 57% of the subjects in the hindsight condition held the city liable for failing to hire a bridge operator. 22 The significance of hindsight bias for legal decisionmaking is obvious: In any number of contexts, juries and other legal decisionmakers are required to evaluate conduct in retrospect and estimate the likelihood that an uncertain event would occur. Examples include determinations of whether a party was negligent, whether conduct was reasonable, and whether a contractual contingency was foreseeable. 25 2. Anchoring In estimating a numerical amount, people tend to start with some initial value-an "anchor"-and then come up with a final estimate by making adjustments to the anchor. If the anchor provides useful information about the underlying value (such as the list price), and if people make reasonable adjustments, this "anchor and adjustment" heuristic can be a useful decisionmaking approach. But anchoring can be problematic if people start with an irrelevant anchor or fail to make adequate adjustments to the initial value. 26 For example, in one study, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman asked subjects to estimate various percentages, such as the percentage of countries in the United Nations that are African. The starting point for the estimates was a number from one to 100 spun on a "wheel of fortune"-an obviously irrelevant number. The subjects were then asked to state whether the correct number was higher or lower and by how much. The median estimate by subjects given ten as the starting number was that 25% of the countries in the United Nations were African; the median estimate by subjects given sixty-five as the starting number was 45%.
27
A number of studies have found that the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff serves as an anchor for verdicts rendered by mock juries. 28 Gretchen B.
use of a debiasing strategy [in defense attorneys' arguments] significantly reduced the number of subjects who believed the defendants were negligent."). 25. Rachlinski, supra note 14, at 593 ("Good faith assessments of what constitutes a reasonable course of action in foresight can easily be judged unreasonable in hindsight. Although the hindsight bias also might affect judgments of subjective knowledge or foreseeability, these theories lack empirical support. . . .
[I]t seems likely that the bias does affect these two types of judgments, however.").
26. Chapman and Brian H. Bornstein studied the effect of plaintiff demands on mock jury verdicts and found that (1) "the amount requested . . . serves as an anchor that affects compensation awards," and (2) "this effect is linear, even with the extreme amounts used in [the] study," which ranged from $100 to $1 billion. 29 The title of their study summarizes their findings: The More You Ask For, the More You Get. 30 To the extent irrelevant numbers involved in the litigation process alter the damages awarded by juries (and judges and arbitrators as well), awards may be higher or lower than is appropriate.
3. The Representativeness Heuristic People tend to predict the likelihood that an event or person falls within a certain category based on whether the characteristics of the event or person seem representative of the category. This "representativeness heuristic" can be useful, but it can also lead to mistakes when people rely too heavily on the characteristic and too little on the rate at which a characteristic occurs in the underlying population (the "base rate").
31
In one study, for example, Tversky and Kahneman described to subjects a woman who had been a philosophy major in college and "was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations." 32 When asked whether it was more likely the woman was a bank teller or a bank teller involved in the feminist movement, almost 90% of the subjects chose the latter. But logically, the class of bank tellers includes the class of feminist bank tellers, such that necessarily the woman is more likely to be a bank teller than a feminist bank teller. The subjects failed to consider the base rate, instead putting too much weight on characteristics that appeared representative of the smaller class. 33 amount] largely on the anchoring influence" of the amount requested by the plaintiff 33. A related heuristic is availability, in which people tend to disregard base rates and place too much weight on memorable events. E.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 5, at 1127-28. Jolls et al. cite "anecdote-driven environmental legislation" as an example, explaining that the availability heuristic "encourages the well-known 'pollutant of the month' syndrome, in which regulation is driven by recent and memorable instances of harm." Jolls et al., supra note 5, at 1518. Some supporters of increased regulation of consumer and employment arbitration have sought to take advantage of this heuristic, citing anecdotal
In the context of legal decisionmaking, commentators have relied on the representativeness heuristic to justify rules of evidence, such as the inadmissibility of character evidence. 34 The fear is that jurors will disregard the relevant base rate and instead place too much weight on the evidence of bad character. 4. Extremeness Aversion Individuals may seek to avoid extreme results. Experimental studies have found that adding an extreme third option alters the choices subjects make between two other options, even if the third option provides no relevant information about the other two choices. 36 For example, in a study by Itamar Simonson and Tversky, subjects who had been asked to choose between two cameras, one costing $169.99 and one costing $239.99, were evenly split between the two. A third option was then added: a camera costing $469.99. With the camera costing $239.99 now the intermediate option, the percentage of subjects choosing it increased, even though there was an additional choice available.
37
According to Cass Sunstein, such "[e]xtremeness aversion gives rise to compromise effects. As between given alternatives, most people seek a compromise." As this discussion illustrates, behavioral studies of legal decisionmaking raise serious questions about the accuracy of decisionmaking by jurors. Indeed, these studies have prompted some commentators to suggest the possibility of reducing the role of juries in the civil justice system. 40 An important caveat, however, is that the extent to which the results of experimental studies using instances of allegedly abusive arbitration practices as evidence of the need for new legislation. mock jurors apply to real-world decisionmaking by jurors cannot be known for certain.
To be sure, some criticisms of experimental studies are not particularly applicable to juries. For example, one reason to doubt the effectiveness of experimental results in predicting real-world outcomes is the effect of selection. As Richard Posner explains:
Selection effects suggest that the experimental and real-world environments will differ systematically. The experimental subjects are chosen more or less randomly; but people are not randomly sorted to jobs and other activities. People who cannot calculate probabilities will either avoid gambling, if they know their cognitive weakness, or, if they do not, will soon be wiped out and thus be forced to discontinue gambling. People who are unusually "fair" will avoid (or, again, be forced out of) roughhouse activities-including highly competitive businesses, trial lawyering, and the academic rat race. Hyperbolic discounters will avoid the financial services industry. These selection effects will not work perfectly, but they are likely to drive a big wedge between experimental and real-world consequences of irrationality.
41
In contrast, the largely random selection of juries bears substantial similarities to the selection of subjects for experimental studies-indeed, some studies have used as subjects individuals waiting to serve as prospective jurors.
42
This suggests that the results of experimental studies may be more appropriately applied to jury decisionmaking than many other real-world activities.
On the other hand, it is no doubt true that the vast majority of jurors take their responsibilities more seriously than do participants in experimental studies. As Philip Peters explains:
Unlike research subjects, jurors are accountable for their decisions. Each juror's vote will be scrutinized not only by the other jurors, but also by the judge and often by the juror's family and friends. Jurors also feel accountable to their communities. This accountability distinguishes jury trials from research studies and has the potential to improve jury decision-making. 43 Moreover, most experimental subjects receive far less information about the case they are asked to decide than real-world jurors, raising questions about the "ecological validity" of the experiments. 44 Certainly other differences between experimental settings and real-world jury trials likewise have the potential to increase or decrease the effect of cognitive biases on the decisionmaking of jurors. As a result, any conclusions from experimental studies in this area will necessarily have some degree of uncertainty. The effects of cognitive illusions on jury decisionmaking have been studied often, at least in experimental settings. The effects of cognitive biases on other legal decisionmakers, especially arbitrators, have been studied far less. This Part discusses the available evidence on how heuristics and cognitive biases might affect arbitrators. It begins by examining the extremely limited empirical research on cognitive illusions in arbitral decisionmaking. Because that evidence (experimental or otherwise) is so limited, this Part then considers evidence on the effect of cognitive illusions on judicial decisionmaking. The assumption inherent in this comparison is that the effect of cognitive illusions on arbitrators is more like their effect on judges than their effect on jurors. If so, evidence on heuristics and cognitive biases from studies of judicial decisionmaking may provide some insights into arbitral decisionmaking as well.
The existing evidence on judges takes two forms: experimental studies of judicial decisionmaking and studies of litigation outcomes comparing the results of cases decided by judges and those decided by juries. Taken together, these studies suggest that (1) judges are less affected by some cognitive illusions than jurors and equally, but no more, affected by others, and (2) these differences seem to persist in actual cases, although to a lesser degree than might be expected from the experimental studies alone. While far from conclusive, this evidence suggests that arbitrators may be somewhat less subject to cognitive illusions than jurors.
A. Empirical Studies of Arbitral Decisionmaking
Empirical studies of the prevalence of cognitive illusions in arbitral decisionmaking are exceedingly rare. I am aware of no such studies using experimental techniques. Moreover, arbitration proceedings are private, and most arbitration awards are unpublished. 45 As a result, studies of outcomes in commercial (including consumer and employment) arbitration are uncommon. 46. In addition to the studies discussed in this section, see the studies of employment arbitration outcomes by Lisa B. One area in which some empirical work has been done is in testing whether arbitrators have a tendency to reach compromise awards-to "split the baby." This phenomenon, if it exists, is sometimes credited to the anchoring of awards on the amount sought by the claimant. 47 Compromise awards would also be consistent with extremeness aversion by arbitrators. Another suggested explanation is that market forces give arbitrators an incentive to compromise, to keep both sides happy and willing to select the arbitrator again. 48 The implications of arbitral incentives are less clear in the context of consumer and employment arbitration (although behavioral considerations would seem to be the same). Individual consumers and employees are unlikely to be repeat players, so arbitrators have little incentive to reach compromise solutions to induce consumers and employees to select them again. Attorneys for consumers and employees, however, may be repeat players. 49 Two published studies of commercial arbitration (one domestic and one international) have found no evidence that arbitrators make compromise awards. In her classic study, Soia Mentschikoff examined commercial arbitrations administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) between 1947 and 1950. 50 In 50% of the awards, the claimant was awarded either all or none of the amount sought. "Obviously," Mentschikoff concluded, "such awards can not be the result of compromise." 51 In addition, Mentschikoff examined more closely thirty-six additional cases, finding that "many of the partial awards are arrived at in a judicial manner since they result from the striking of particular items of damage that the arbitrators believe are not justified under the facts or law of the particular case." 52 A recent study of international arbitration awards by Stephanie E. Keer and Richard W. Naimark also rejected the view that arbitrators make compromise awards. 53 In a sample of fifty-four international arbitration proceedings administered by the AAA, the mean award as a percentage of the amount claimed was 50.53%, and the median award was 46.66%. The distribution of the awards, however, was bimodal, with 31% of claimants recovering nothing and 35% recovering 100% of the amount claimed. The remaining 34% of claimants 48. Cf. Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 523 (1997) ("The dynamic of arbitrator self-interest has long been familiar in collective bargaining cases and is thought, for example, to provide one explanation for the apparently common practice of compromise awards. Repeat business for the arbitrator is likely only if he is able to retain the future goodwill of both union and management; the desire to do so may give him an incentive (in the hallowed phrase) to 'split the baby.'").
49. were awarded a widely distributed percentage of the amount claimed.
54
Keer and Naimark concluded that "the results from this study show emphatically that arbitrators do not engage in the practice of 'splitting the baby.'" 55 The studies examining the possibility of compromise awards thus have uncovered no evidence of extremeness aversion in arbitral decisionmaking.
56
Several studies have sought to compare outcomes in arbitration and litigation, but they shed little light on behavioral aspects of arbitral decisionmaking. In one study, Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill compared a sample of 261 AAA employment arbitration awards with verdicts in state-court employment cases and employment discrimination cases in federal court.
57
Relying on the AAA's categorization of the arbitration agreements as either "promulgated" by the company or individually negotiated by the employee, they found that winrates and awards in arbitrations arising under individually negotiated agreements were largely indistinguishable from the outcomes in court cases. They acknowledged, however, that they were unable to control either for "original differences in the merits of the disputes routed to arbitration and litigation" or for differences in settlements, which could undercut the comparability of disputes in arbitration and litigation.
58
In another study, William Howard compared a sample of arbitration awards dealing with employment discrimination claims to court cases involving alleged employment discrimination.
59
The mean jury award in the court cases studied was $417,178, while the mean arbitration award was $114,905. Howard did not attempt to control for differences in the claims, such as the strength of the claim on the merits and the extent of injuries suffered. Thus, at least some of the difference in recovery between court and arbitration likely is due to differences in 54. Id. at 574. Keer and Naimark also describe an unpublished AAA study of 4,479 commercial arbitration awards with results consistent with their findings. Id. at 574 (finding that "approximately 42% of those cases were awarded 0-20% of their original claim amount," while "30% were awarded 81-100% of their original claim amount").
55. Id. at 578. Neither study makes any attempt to compare the likelihood of compromise awards in arbitration to the likelihood of compromise judgments or verdicts in civil litigation.
56. An alternative interpretation of these results might be that extremeness aversion applies only to choices among discrete alternatives but not to choices along a continuum, as an arbitrator (or jury) would make in determining the amount of damages to award. 64 Examining a sample of 353 cases tried both by an arbitrator and a jury (thus ensuring that the facts of the cases were the same), he found substantial similarities between jury decisionmaking and arbitral decisionmaking. 65 Unfortunately, the results provide little insight into how arbitration awards in consumer and employment cases (in other words, arbitrations that are not court-annexed) compare to jury verdicts. In Wittman's study, arbitrators had a strong incentive to make an award close to the likely jury verdict in the case, and parties had a strong incentive to select arbitrators whose awards were accurate predictions of jury verdicts. 66 Parties to predispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have no comparable incentive to prefer arbitrators whose awards mirror jury verdicts.
Finally, Neil Vidmar and Jeffrey J. Rice conducted an experimental study that compared the damages awarded by jurors and arbitrators in a hypothetical medical malpractice case. 67 They gave a description of the case to twenty-one 60 lawyers who had served as arbitrators "for various personal injury, contract, and labor disputes," and eighty-nine prospective jurors who actually had been selected for jury duty. 68 The median and mean damage awards by the two groups were statistically indistinguishable. 69 The damage awards by the individual jurors, however, had a substantially higher variance (although when the individual awards were pooled into twelve-juror panels, the variance fell substantially). 70 Overall, the extremely limited empirical evidence on cognitive illusions in arbitral decisionmaking casts little light on how arbitral decisionmaking compares to jury decisionmaking. Arbitrators (at least in commercial cases) do not seem to be subject to extremeness aversion, and there is some experimental evidence that arbitral awards may have a similar mean but less variance than the verdicts of individual jurors. Studies comparing outcomes in litigation and arbitration, while increasingly common, do not focus specifically on cognitive illusions and are subject to serious limitations due to case-selection effects. At present, there is far too little evidence to draw firm conclusions.
B. Empirical Studies Comparing Decisionmaking by Judges and Juries
Notwithstanding the limited empirical evidence on heuristics and cognitive biases in arbitral decisionmaking, it may be possible to gain some insight into arbitral decisionmaking by examining judicial decisionmaking, a close but by no means exact analogy. Arbitrators, like judges, resolve disputes on a recurring basis.
71
Jurors' experiences, by contrast, are limited to individual trials. Arbitrators, like judges, receive specialized training; jurors receive only a judge's instructions. Many arbitrators, like judges, are lawyers. 72 The vast majority of jurors are not. Demographically, too, arbitrators tend to look more like judges than jurors. 73 The analogy is, of course, only a rough one. Nevertheless, given To date, the results are somewhat conflicting. Nevertheless, as a general matter, the studies have found judicial decisionmaking to be less affected by cognitive illusions than decisionmaking by juries in some respects, but equally affected in others. 76 In one study, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich administered a questionnaire to federal magistrate judges attending a Federal Judicial Center workshop in 1999.
77
A total of 168 judges returned the questionnaire, with one requesting that the response not be used in further research, leaving a sample of 167. The questionnaire contained a series of hypothetical fact patterns designed to test for the effect of various heuristics and cognitive biases on judicial decisionmaking. Based on the answers to the questionnaire, the authors concluded that judges were less affected by some cognitive illusions than jurors but similarly affected by others. The judges "were impressive" in answering correctly "a difficult he models evidence a remarkable degree of similarity among all groups of decisionmakers, plus a high degree of predictability, in regard to their judgments of injury severity. As to the translation of injury perceptions into monetary awards, however, more differences among the groups appeared, and the predictive power of the models declined.").
76. See Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 1200 ("Although few studies have been conducted on judges, what work has been done suggests that judges are also subject to the same cognitive errors in judgment that affect juries.").
77. Guthrie et al., supra note 6. For a study on hindsight bias using a sample of fifty-eight auditors and sixty-five state and federal trial judges, see thereby avoiding the representativeness heuristic (although 60% still answered incorrectly). 78 However, the results suggested that judges were as susceptible to anchoring effects and hindsight bias as other decisionmakers. 79 Thus, judges awarded substantially less when the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction (which plainly was met on the facts) than when no such motion was filed. In the view of Guthrie et al., "the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum anchored their damage awards." 80 Further, judges' predictions of the likely outcome of a case on appeal were highly sensitive to what they were told about the actual outcome, which, according to Guthrie et al., was an illustration of hindsight bias.
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A study by W. Kip Viscusi and Reid Hastie found judges to be less subject to hindsight bias than mock jurors. 82 The authors distributed a questionnaire to a sample of state-court judges (both trial and appellate) attending a law-andeconomics program. They received ninety-five responses, a response rate of almost 100%. They then administered the same questionnaire to mock jurors, to facilitate comparison. In a pair of tests for hindsight bias, Viscusi and Hastie found that the judges "were much less prone to hindsight bias than are jurors in their treatment of corporate safety decisions. Indeed, in making legal judgments, there was little effect of hindsight for judges, as compared to substantial effects for mock jurors." 86 While perhaps underestimating the susceptibility of judges generally to hindsight bias, at a minimum, the study suggests that some judges are able to avoid this bias. As such, it also suggests that some arbitrators may be able to avoid hindsight bias as well.
Studies of Litigation Outcomes
While experimental studies are able to control for the underlying facts of the dispute, studies of real-world litigation outcomes avoid charges of lack of realism. 87 This section examines several studies that compare outcomes (either win rates or damage awards) in cases decided by judges and juries, to see the extent to which experimental differences in judicial versus jury decisionmaking may affect real cases.
The earliest and best-known study seeking to compare outcomes between judges and juries is Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel's University of Chicago Jury Project.
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Kalven and Zeisel collected reports on 4000 civil jury verdicts and then asked each judge "how he would have decided the case had it been tried to him alone." 89 They found that in 78% of the cases, the judge agreed with the jury's verdict on liability. In 12%, the jury found for the plaintiff while the judge would have found for the defendant. In the remaining 10%, the jury found for the defendant while the judge would have found for the plaintiff. 90 Juries, however, awarded significantly higher damages. Of the cases in which the judge agreed with the jury's finding for the plaintiff (44%), on average the jury-awarded damages were 20% higher than what the judge would have awarded.
91
One weakness with the methodology is that the judges were asked whether they agreed with the jury's verdict after it was rendered, rather than being asked before the verdict what they thought the outcome should be. Thus, "it is possible that their responses partially reflected their attitudes toward the jury system in addition to their evaluation of the cases at hand." 92 The study has the advantage, however, of ensuring that the cases evaluated by the jury and the judge were identical.
Other studies of litigation outcomes have been much less able to control for case characteristics. Thus, they are potentially subject to serious selection effects that make interpretation of the results difficult.
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For example, in a sample of federal court cases decided between 1979 and 1989, Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg found a number of categories of cases in which plaintiffs had higher win rates before judges than before juries.
94
They concluded that "the most plausible explanation of the data lies in small differences between judges' and juries' treatment of cases and, more importantly, in the parties' varying the selection of cases that reach judge and jury."
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A subsequent study by Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok, using a sample of statecourt verdicts, found that "[j]uries do grant systematically larger awards to injured plaintiffs than judges."
96 Most of the difference, they found, was due to differential routing of cases to judges and juries:
The differences in judge and jury decision-making we have discovered, however, explain only one-quarter to one-third of the difference in average award rates across judges and juries. Three [-] quarters to two-thirds of the difference in average awards is due not to differences in decision-making but to differences in the sample of cases appearing before judges and juries.
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Of course, the same results could be restated with the opposite emphasis: up to one-third of the difference between awards by judges and juries persists even after attempting to control for case-selection effects.
A recent study by Theodore Eisenberg et al. focused on the award of punitive damages by judges and jurors. 98 They considered a sample of state-court jury trials from forty-five of the seventy-five most populous counties in the United States from 1996, and found that "[j]uries and judges award punitive damages at about the same rate, and their punitive awards bear about the same relation to their compensatory awards." 99 While they found somewhat greater variance in jury awards, "the effect is not robust and leads to very few jury punitive awards outside the range of what judges are expected to award." 100 Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi, using the same data as Eisenberg et al., reached a strikingly different conclusion: What we found based on a careful statistical analysis was that these data are quite consistent with there being greater restraint by judges. Our statistical analysis of the level of punitive damages awards for all cases, including those with compensatory damages but no punitive awards, showed that juries award higher levels of punitive damages. If one considers the components of this effect, juries also differ from judges. Juries have a higher probability of awarding punitive damages. Moreover, juries are especially likely to make a large punitive damages award conditional on there being a punitive damages award. Thus, juries are more prone to generate large awards than are judges. 101 The differing results, according to Hersch and Viscusi, were the result of the two studies treating trials from one county differently and Eisenberg et al.'s use of two jury variables highly correlated with one another. 102 A final study by Eisenberg (with different coauthors) focused directly on cognitive differences between judges and juries and found more coherence in punitive damages awards than behavioral theories would predict. 103 The cognitive problem considered was one of "scaling without a modulus": the difficulty of translating moral judgments about behavior into a quantitative damages award. 104 The authors found (using the same state-court jury sample as above) 105 some incoherence in punitive damages awards of the sort predicted by the theory, but far less than experimental studies would indicate. 106 They concluded that "[f]orces seem to be at work that already promote coherence," so structural changes suggested by some commentators (such as shifting punitive damages decisionmaking from juries to judges) 107 may be unnecessary.
C. Conclusions
The existing evidence on the effect of cognitive illusions on arbitral decisionmaking is slight. Drawing from studies of judicial decisionmaking (on the assumption that arbitrators are more like judges than jurors), however, provides further insights. The experimental studies of judges and jurors, while certainly not conclusive, find that judges are less subject to some cognitive biases and heuristics than jurors and equally, but no more, subject to others. Although studies of litigation outcomes suggest that the effect of cognitive illusions is less than might be expected, some differences in outcome seem to persist. As such, the studies suggest (albeit tentatively) that arbitral decisionmaking, to the extent it is like judicial decisionmaking, is less subject than jury decisionmaking to some cognitive illusions, and equally subject to others.
IV STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN JURY TRIALS AND ARBITRATION
Part III suggested a tentative conclusion about the effects of cognitive biases and heuristics on arbitral decisionmaking, based largely (although not exclusively) on experimental studies: arbitrators may be less subject to at least some cognitive illusions than are jurors. This Part examines various structural differences between jury trials and arbitration proceedings and considers whether the differences are likely to increase or decrease the effects of cognitive illusions.
A. Group Versus Individual Decisionmaking
A key difference between juries and arbitrators is in the decisionmaking dynamic. Arbitrators decide either alone or in panels of three, 110 whereas juries decide in groups varying from six to twelve members.
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Most experimental studies of jury behavior ignore the possible effects of group deliberations and focus on the decisionmaking of individual jurors.
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Others select "synthetic 109. If arbitral decisionmaking bears at least some relationship to decisionmaking by judges, one might ask why businesses use arbitration clauses rather than jury-trial waivers in their standard-form contracts. There are several possible explanations. First, arbitral decisionmaking may be less subject to biases and heuristics than judicial decisionmaking, perhaps because of market competition or the subject-matter expertise of arbitrators. Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 64 (2000) ("Judges surely have some incentives to make good law and avoid illusions of judgment, but they lack the incentives that other institutions face."); Posner, supra note 95, at 1494 ("The literature on these illusions provides some basis for thinking that market settings tend to dispel or at least reduce them, but none for thinking that government processes have similar effects."). Second, businesses might be indifferent between judges and arbitrators (or perhaps even prefer judges), but use arbitration clauses because courts are unwilling to enforce predispute waivers of the right to jury trial. "[P] erhaps the greatest limitation of mock-trial simulations is that the vast majority of them juries" that combine individual respondents into jury panels and then use the median response as the verdict of the synthetic jury. 113 While such an approach tends to mitigate the effect of outlying responses, it does not take into account the dynamics of group deliberations and any effect they may have on actual verdicts.
If group decisions differ from individual decisions, these differences in decisionmaking dynamics could be an important structural differences between jury trials and arbitration. One possibility is that group deliberations dampen the effect of cognitive illusions on jury verdicts because discussions within the group improve the accuracy of the group's decision. Because arbitrators decide alone or in small groups, there is no, or at least less, opportunity for group deliberations to reduce the effect of cognitive illusions on arbitration awards. On the other hand, group polarization may result in group decisions that are more extreme than the median of the individual members' views. 114 If so, jury verdicts may be more extreme than predicted by experimental studies, while arbitral decisionmaking would be much less affected.
The empirical evidence on the point is mixed. 115 At least some studies, however, have found that deliberations can exacerbate, rather than lessen, cognitive biases in decisionmaking. 116 For example, in an experimental study of punitive damages awards, David Schkade and others found that jury deliberations tended to result in more extreme verdicts: when individual jurors rated behav-ior as worthy of strong punishment, deliberation increased the overall jury rating; when individual jurors rated behavior as worthy only of weak punishment, deliberation tended to decrease the overall jury rating.
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As applied to punitive damages, when individual jurors favored large awards of punitive damages, deliberations increased the amount awarded by the jury. Indeed, Schkade et al. reported that 27% of mock juries voting to award punitive damages awarded amounts as great or greater than the highest individual award before deliberations. 118 Similar effects have been identified in studies of decisionmaking by federal appellate courts. 119 Thus, at least some evidence indicates that group deliberations do not reduce and may actually heighten the effects of cognitive illusions on decisionmaking. Other evidence suggests that deliberations might moderate such effects. 120 The bottom line is uncertain.
B. Markets and Incentives
Jurors are selected randomly and paid a small, fixed fee. 121 Their "financial incentive to conduct a careful sifting of the evidence is nil." 118. Id. at 1155-56 (finding 10% were higher than the highest individual award and 17% equal to the highest individual award). They also found greater variability in awards by deliberating juries, and concluded: "This finding suggests, though it certainly does not prove, the possibility that juries will produce more variability in awards than judges (a suggestion supported by the possibility that judicial experience with a wider range of cases will introduce the equivalent of a 'modulus' by which to discipline dollar awards 124. Posner, supra note 95, at 1494; see also Sunstein, supra note 5, at 150 ("In some circumstances, market forces are indeed strong enough to make behavioral economics irrelevant for predictive purposes. Then the question becomes whether it is possible to identify those circumstances. This is a large question, and we lack authoritative answers."). For a pair of recent studies, see John A. List, Does Market Experi-that reduce cognitive illusions are more likely in market settings, 125 and the greater amount at stake may lead to less biased results than experimental studies find, although the evidence on this point is uncertain.
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Other commentators, however, are skeptical that the market has sufficient corrective effect. 127 Moreover, competition among arbitrators also gives rise to the possibility of "repeat player" bias, in which arbitrators have an incentive to favor parties who are more likely to provide future business. 128 To date, however, the evidence is inconclusive on whether such bias exists.
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Lisa Bingham found a "repeat player effect" in a sample of 270 AAA employment arbitration awards issued in 1993 and 1994. 130 Employees were awarded some recovery in 63% of all awards, but in only 16% of awards against repeat player employers-which Bingham defined as employers who were parties to more than one award in the sample. Employees recovered 48% of their demands against non-repeat player employers, but only 11% of their demands against repeat player employers. 131 Bingham made clear that there were several possible explanations for these results, including that there were "systematic differences in the merits of these cases, in that employees in repeat player cases ("Overall, the data pattern observed suggests that the learning process at work is one where the psychological effects at the heart of prospect theory are gradually attenuated: experienced agents are more willing to part with their endowments than lesser-experienced agents.").
125. She concluded, however, that "these patterns largely correspond with differences in the nature of the basis for arbitration." According to Bingham, "[r]epeat player employers get to arbitration based on an implied contract stemming from a personnel manual or employee handbook," cases in which the employee "may have a substantively weaker legal claim." 134 In short, the repeat player effect Bingham has identified seems to have had more to do with the strength of the repeat player employer's claim (and, perhaps, ability to screen cases) than with the incentives facing the arbitrator. In a subsequent study, Bingham and Simon Sarraf compared outcomes before and after the Employment Due Process Protocol, 135 and found that "employers arbitrating pursuant to an adhesive personnel handbook arbitration clause are less successful in employment arbitration after the Protocol than before." 136 They concluded that "[s]elf-regulation through the Due Process Protocol is making a difference in the outcomes of employment arbitration." 137 Thus, the available empirical evidence on the relationship between markets and arbitral decisionmaking is inconclusive. While there is reason to believe that market forces may reduce the effect of cognitive illusions on arbitral decisionmaking, the results of existing studies are far from conclusive. Conversely, while arbitrators may have an incentive to favor repeat players in their awards, the limited evidence of a repeat player effect seems to be due to case selection by the parties and not bias on the part of the arbitrators. Overall, then, no definitive answer is possible.
C. Other Differences
There are a variety of other structural differences between arbitration proceedings and jury trials that could correct for, or exacerbate, the effect of cognitive illusions on legal decisionmaking. The following are a sample. 
Fees
To file a lawsuit, a plaintiff merely pays a small filing fee (in addition to paying his or her own lawyer, on a contingency basis or otherwise). 138 No other charge is made by the public court system; judges' salaries and other administrative costs are paid by the government. By comparison, a claimant filing a demand for arbitration pays fees both to any arbitration institution providing administrative services and to the arbitrator or arbitrators resolving the dispute. 139 As a general matter, the fees are graduated, increasing as the amount sought by the claimant increases.
The policy discussions 140 and court cases 141 dealing with arbitration fees consider the extent to which such fees might preclude individuals from asserting claims in arbitration. The focus here, however, is on a different consequence of arbitration fees: their effect on party behavior in the arbitration proceeding. As discussed above, a number of experimental studies have found that the amounts claimed by plaintiffs have a strong anchoring effect on jury verdicts. 142 In court, the plaintiff has little financial incentive to moderate damages claims. In arbitration, however, a claimant has a significant financial incentive to be realistic about damages claims because of the graduated fees charged by most arbitration institutions.
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Claimants who ask for more have to pay more, which may counteract to some degree any bias resulting from anchoring on the amount sought. 144 2. Rules of Evidence Detailed rules govern the admissibility and presentation of evidence in court. By contrast, formal rules of evidence ordinarily do not apply in arbitration. 145 Further, despite having the power to exclude irrelevant evidence, 146 arbi-appellate review is available for arbitration awards. 158 Courts will vacate awards only on narrow procedural grounds 159 or for manifest disregard of the law. 160 Thus, in arbitration there is far less opportunity to avoid any errors resulting from heuristics or cognitive biases through appellate review than there is in court.
V CONCLUSION
Businesses cite arbitration as a way to avoid aberrant jury verdicts, implicitly if not explicitly assuming that arbitrators make "better" decisions than juries. By contrast, consumer advocates criticize arbitration as a way for businesses to avoid paying damages to deserving claimants, effectively assuming that juries make better decisions than arbitrators. These conflicting perspectives pose an important question in the debate over predispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts: How do decisions by arbitrators compare to decisions by juries?
From a behavioral perspective, arbitral decisionmaking appears to be less subject to cognitive illusions than decisionmaking by juries. This is not an across-the-board conclusion about the superiority of arbitral decisionmaking, but rather a tentative conclusion about the effect of heuristics and cognitive biases on two modes of legal decisionmaking. It is based largely on experimental studies of decisionmaking by judges, and it recognizes that the comparison between judges and arbitrators is not perfect and that drawing real-world conclusions from experimental results is difficult. If arbitral decisionmaking in fact proves to be less subject to cognitive illusions than jury decisionmaking, it would provide some evidence that arbitrators may make "better," or at least no worse, decisions than juries.
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this analysis, however, is that more research is needed on how cognitive illusions affect arbitral decisionmaking. Commentators have already called for studies on the psychology of dispute resolution in the international arbitration context. 162 Neil Vidmar and Lisa
